Let us assume away that problem: suppose proper subject matter jurisdiction exists in state court. Suppose the debt transaction arose off the reservation. Suppose a tort was committed off the reservation. Suppose a sale is made off the reservation. But suppose further that by the time the plaintiff brings suit, the defendant is physically within the boundaries of a reservation. Can the court get personal jurisdiction? How? Suppose personal jurisdiction is obtained and judgment is given for the plaintiff. Can this judgment be enforced against property on the reservation? How? These are the questions this article addresses.
Focusing our attention on service of process and execution of judgment may seem odd, at first glance. The two events are, after all, at opposite ends of the litigation spectrum, but they are related enough to justify an analysis in one article. First, both events are essentially procedural and raise issues distinguishable from the subject matter concerns of Williams v. Lee and its progeny.' Second, in both events the underlying issue is the application of state law on the reservation-by the sheriff or private server serving process and by the sheriff executing on a judgment. Third, there is something of a slippery slope between the two. There is an understandable reluctance on the part of a state court judge to find service proper when the result is a valid judgment a judgment's being void. Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 624 F.2d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 1980 ) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 955. The test is whether "there is a 'total want of jurisdiction' as distinguished from 'an error in the exercise of jurisdiction. ' " Id., quoting Lubben v. Selective Service System, 453 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir. 1972) . Hence, if the court wrongly decides the jurisdictional issue, the judgment may not be set aside, but if the court does not address the issue, it might be.
(B) In the court of a sister state. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963) , held that "once the matter has been fully litigated and judicially determined, it can[notj be retried in another State in litigation between the same parties." Id. at 115. Thus, the result appears to be the same: if the jurisdictional question was fully and fairly litigated at the trial level, it may not be collaterally attacked on enforcement in another jurisdiction. If not, then full faith and credit does not compel foreign enforcement.
(C)
In an Indian tribal court. The analysis is similar as in (B), with the additional complication of the application of full faith and credit to Indian tribes. See infra text accompanying notes 69-88. In summary, the original "Lee v. Williams" hypothetical situation left the subject matter jurisdiction question unraised and unlitigated at trial and on appeal. On enforcement in the forum state, rule 60(b)(4) should be available. On enforcement in a foreign state, full faith and credit concerns should not block collateral attack. On enforcement in tribal court, full faith and credit is even more problematical and the defendant should be able to halt enforcement. 5. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol10/iss2/2
1982] SER VICE/PROCESS-EXECUTION/JUDGMENT 259
that is unenforceable somewhere within the state. The events are distinguishable and the situation described is exactly the one that prevails, but the reluctance that one sees in the cases 6 to treat service of process and execution of judgment differently justifies the discussion of both in one article. The issues are, then, how may process be served and how may judgments be enforced on the reservation?
II. Service of Process on the Reservation In Public Law 280 States
Public Law 280 was an act of Congress that permitted some states and required others to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian country.' Appendix I lists the states that have assumed Public Law 280 jurisdiction.' Generally speaking, they are not the states with the largest Indian reservations.
As Bryan v. Itasca County 9 made clear, albeit in dicta, 10 a state that has assumed Public Law 280 jurisdiction has avoided the Williams v. Lee subject matter jurisdiction problem and may apply its rules of decision even in suits involving reservation transactions. It would seem to go without saying that such a state's service of process statute could be validly applied on the reservation. If not, then notwithstanding Bryan's approval of the lawsuit in state court with determination under state law, the defendant could still find sanctuary on the reservation. True, Public Law AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW 280 did not terminate the reservation" and not all state laws apply there,' 2 but it is difficult to imagine that Congress would legislate to remove the barrier to subject matter jurisdiction while retaining a similar barrier to personal jurisdiction. This writer concludes, then, that in Public Law 280 states, process may be served on the reservation under state law.
In Non-Public Law 280 States
When Public Law 280 jurisdiction has not been assumed, the state court obtains subject matter jurisdiction, not by congressional grant, but by common law permission provided the transaction sued over is off-reservation. 3 What of personal jurisdiction? Service of process under state statute or rule on the reservation should be seen as an attempted application of state law on the reservation, subject to the familiar two-step analysis: (1) Does that application run afoul of any congressional enactment (hereafter "preemption" or "supremacy")? (2) Does that application "infringe upon the Indians' right to make their own laws and be ruled by them" (hereafter denoted by references to
Williams or infringement)?
Thus the first issue is whether any federal statute prohibits the application of a state service of process statute or rule on the reservation. None comes to mind and no case has ever so held, but the enigmatic Kennerly v. District Court' 4 requires that the possible preempting effect of Public Law 280 be considered even in those states that have not assumed jurisdiction thereunder. Is assumption under Public Law 280 the only way a state may exercise jurisdiction on the reservation? Though Kennerly rather expressly says so,' 5 it should probably not be read so broadly. In- Let us hypothesize such an infringement: Suppose a tribe, fearful of breaches of the peace, determines that process may be served on the reservation only by a tribal law enforcement officer who must place the summons in the defendant's hand. Suppose further that the state in which that tribe resides has a very liberal rule allowing the summons to be tacked on the defendant's door by any disinterested adult. Plaintiff chooses Ace Process Servers, Inc., whose agent visits the defendant's reservation home and posts the summons. Is the service valid?" 8 Williams v. Lee suggests that it is not. The tribe has made a legitimate policy choice and the application of the more liberal state rule on the reservation frustrates that choice. Indeed, many of the most sensitive services will come in just the context of an off-reservation lawsuit. To allow the state rule to control here would infringe upon Indian self-government at least as much as to allow the Arizona court to adjudicate Lee's suit against Williams.
No case has been found that brings the hypothetical situation to life, but it is not difficult to find one ripe for such a controversy. New Mexico's service of process rule is not so liberal as the hypothetical one, but it allows service on a defendant other than by a law enforcement officer.' 9 The Jicarilla Apache Tribe, on the other hand, requires that civil process be served by a disinterested police officer. 20 18. There is, of course, a due process inquiry as to whether such posting gives the defendant adequate notice. The reservation location would appear not to affect this question and it need not be explored here.
19. N.M. R. Civ. P. 4(d). 20. Jicarilla Law & Order Code, ch. II, § 4(c) . This statute gives the rule for service of process in tribal court. The Code does not speak to service on the reservation for an off-reservation suit. It seems that it might, in which case the Williams argument would be even stronger.
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Horse 2 in New Mexico court over an off-reservation cause of action. Smith serves process on Fast Horse in a manner that meets the New Mexico requirements but that would not be sufficient if the suit were brought in tribal court. Is the service good?
At this point it is important to distinguish two inquiries. First, did Fast Horse receive adequate notice of the suit in the New Mexico court? If not, then the due process clause of the United States Constitution requires dismissal. Here, the answer is probably that notice was sufficient. The New Mexico service statute, we may assume, is constitutional; it comports with due process; it provides the notice the Constitution requires, and the reservation location of the defendant is immaterial to that question of notice.
But the teaching of Williams v. Lee is that, when a reservation is involved, there is an inquiry beyond due process; there is an interest to be protected other than the defendant's right to notice of the suit. That interest is the tribe's right to "make its own laws and be ruled by them." ' 22 This is an interest that has little to do with the defendant's right to receive fair notice of the suit against him. The interest is the tribe's, not the individual's,"1 and here the tribe's legitimate choice to require service by a tribal police officer has been frustrated by application of New Mexico law on the reservation.
It is not suggested that the result is foretold, and there are arguments the other way. It could be said, indeed, that New Mexico law is not being applied on the reservation, that the effect of a service of process rule is to say what must be done in order for the suit to continue off the reservation and, if those acts are 21. It is intended that names of the parties indicate their races, and indeed many of the most difficult problems come in interracial conflicts such as that hypothesized. See, e.g., Annis v. Dewey County Bank, 335 F. Supp. 133 (D.S.D. 1971); Francisco v. State, 113 Ariz. 427, 556 P.2d 1 (1976) ; State Securities, Inc. v. Anderson, 84 N.M. 629, 506 P.2d 786 (1973 Suppose the defendant is an Indian but not a member of the tribe on whose reservation service is being made. Such problems are dealt with briefly in the Colville case, 447 U.S. 134, 160-61 (1980 ). 22. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171-72 (1973 , quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1959 done, wherever they are done, then the New Mexico court may continue with the suit. Furthermore, the Jicarilla rule does not say that service of process for a New Mexico suit must be undertaken by a police officer, but rather that a service of process for a Jicarilla suit must be so done. Nevertheless, on balance it appears that, at least in the New Mexico-Jicarilla hypothetical example, Williams requires that service by a private person on the reservation should be invalid. The cases addressing the issue are split and, generally speaking, unenlightening. Two cases have directly held that service on the reservation was improper, 2" not because of any federal barrier but because the state sheriff had no authority on the reservation. In both cases state law required service to be undertaken by a sheriff in his official capacity and both courts found a sheriff to be without official capacity on the reservation.25 Several other courts have opined in unexplained dicta that reservation service is improper. 6 Three cases have held service on the reservation to be proper, 25. This may understate the importance of the two cases a bit. Read narrowly, the two cases say that service of process was invalid because a statute required service by a sheriff acting in his official capacity and neither sheriff could do so on the reservation. Stripped of their offices, the sheriffs were private process servers, and service by such a person is insufficient under state law. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the question of the sheriff's status, official or not, on the reservation is similar to the basic service of process question under discussion. The courts' opinions show that. See Francisco v. State, 113 Ariz. 427, 429-30, 556 P.2d 1, 3-4 (1976); Martin v. Denver Juvenile Court, 177 Colo. 261, 263-64, 493 P.2d 1093 , 1094 (1972 . It is interesting to note that the Arizona Supreme Court, in its decision in the famous Williams v. Lee, 83 Ariz. 241, 319 P.2d 998 (1958 ), rev'd 358 U.S. 217 (1959 Securities, Inc. v. Anderson, 2 " the New Mexico Supreme Court's discussion of service of process is inextricably intertwined with the discussion of whether the state court has subject matter jurisdiction over the suit on notes made offreservation. The court concludes: "We believe that state jurisdiction is proper in cases between Indians and non-Indians involving contractual obligations incurred off the reservation and we hold that process may be served on Indians while they are within the boundaries of the reservation." 2 9 However, the discussion of preemption and infringement does not support the second half of the conclusion. The court introduces this discussion with reference to service of process,"° but the diversion of the court's attention to the subject matter of the suit is shown by its preliminary conclusion: "In this case there is not a proprietary interest in land, one Indian is not suing another Indian and the transaction did not arise in Indian country." 3 ' These factors, of course, concern the state court's ability to hear the suit at all and have little to do with the manner in which the plaintiff served process on the defendant. The court does not discuss factors relevant to service, nor does it mention the tribe's service statute. The New Mexico Supreme Court apparently assumed that personal jurisdiction tags along with subject matter jurisdiction and that a discongruity between the state and tribal service rules poses no issue at all. 32 cedural issue, without reaching the merits of the defendant's argument. The concurring justice thought the service was proper because the underlying transaction occurred off the reservation.
28. 84 N.M. 629, 506 P.2d 786 (1973) . 29. Id. at 632, 506 P.2d at 789. 30. "In an attempt to determine whether Indian immunity from process is necessary in this case to protect the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them, we have surveyed a number of cases and other authorities." Id. at 631, 506 P.2d at 788 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 632, 506 P.2d at 789. 32. Although the court does not mention the tribe's service statute, that detail is independently discoverable. The reservation involved is the Navajo Reservation, see 506 P.2d at 786, and the applicable service rule reads as follows:
The summons and complaint shall be served by any officer of the Navajo Police Department or any other person authorized by the Court by delivery of a copy to the defendant or someone over the age of sixteen (16) living at the usual residence of the defendant or working at the usual place of business of the defendant. If personal service cannot be effected within five days, notice may be given by registered mail. If service by registered mail cannot be effected, then notice may be given by publication in the Navajo Times for three (3) weeks." NAVAJO R. Civ. P. 3 (1977) .
There are a number of discongruities between this rule and the one which obtains in 4 and holds service proper. Once again, most of the opinion deals with the ability of the state court to take subject matter jurisdiction over the suit. In the puzzling end to the opinion, the court first suggests that personal jurisdiction is unnecessary in this case, 3 " then suggests that once process has been served and notice had, any legal impediment to the service becomes moot." The court concludes without analysis that "Indian country is not a federal enclave off limits to state process service." 3 " Perhaps Bad Horse is explained by the frustration the Montana Supreme Court feels with the doctrine of tribal sovereignty. As recent United States Supreme Court opinions have held, the doctrine, and perhaps the frustration, are here to stay. 9 Given that tribal sovereignty and the Williams infringement test are clearly parts of the law, Bad Horse is best relegated to historical obscurity." 0 New Mexico courts. See N.M. R. Civ. P. 4 (1980) . E.g., private process servers need not be approved by the New Mexico court, except for certain writs; a 15-year-old may receive the New Mexico summons; mailed service in New Mexico must also be posted; notice by publication in New Mexico is more carefully regulated.
The facts are not stated completely enough to know whether the actual service in the case satisfied the New Mexico rule but not the Navajo rule.
33 36. "Once the district court has assumed jurisdiction over the subject matter and process has been properly served, the defendant cannot throw up a shield around herself by claiming that the state process server cannot pierce the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation and serve civil process therein." Id., 517 P.2d at 897. Limpy, 636 P.2d 266 (1981) . In Limpy the court deferred to a Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court advisory opinion that the tribal court had jurisdiction over divorce actions between reservation residents and that Montana law would apply. Having found that a suitable tribal forum existed, the court found its concerns expressed in Bad Horse met, and denied state subject matter jurisdiction.
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The latest case holding on-reservation service proper, and the most thoughtful of the three, is LeClair v. Powers 4 l from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. In that case Georgia LeClair sued her husband, Alexander, for divorce. Alexander was served process in Indian country by an Oklahoma sheriff. Alexander did not appear at several hearings or at the divorce trial. At a contempt hearing he challenged the court's jurisdiction over his person and lost. He .then sought a writ of prohibition against Powers, the trial judge.
The supreme court denied the petition for the writ, citing Bad Horse and State Securities. Once again the court does not clearly separate subject matter and personal jurisdiction, especially in that part of the opinion where the earlier cases are cited. This time, however, the petitioner, defendant in the original trial, was able to bring home to the court the separate nature of his argument: "service by the State according to its own procedures is asserted as an interference with the self-governing activities of the Indian tribe." 2 However, the court finds no conflicting tribal service of process rule. 3 Since the Ponca Tribe has a so-called "Court of Indian Offenses" whose rules are set by federal regulation, 4 the court is correct in finding that no tribal selfgovernment interest is implicated.
In summary, then, with respect to service of process, two thoughts are in order. First, the next court to deal with the issue might well take the issue as one of first impression as the precedents, both ways, are so weak. The cases finding service improper are limitable by narrow bits of Arizona and Colorado law or merely state a conclusion in dictum. The cases finding service proper are not careful in their analysis (State Securities) , are distorted by a fear of tribal self-government (Bad Horse), or are limited to the unusual case of Code of Federal Regulation courts (LeClair). Thus, a case that will apply the Williams test thoughtfully to the application of state service laws on the reservation is awaited.
Second, in many cases the legal difficulty is avoidable. Most tribes have service of process rules, many of which are similar to 41. 632 P.2d 370 (Okla. 1981 [Vol. I0
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol10/iss2/2 the corresponding state rules. It is possible that acting in conformity with the tribal rule will also satisfy the requirements of the state rule. If this is the case, then the rather knotty problems herein discussed disappear as the laws of both jurisdictions have been followed. If subject matter jurisdiction exists in the state court and if process has been served in accordance with the tribal rule and if such service satisfies the state rule, then the suit may proceed with no fear of infringement. While most legal problems disappear when service is accomplished under both tribal and state law, several practical problems remain. First, tribal law must be discovered, and that is, generally speaking, a more difficult legal research task than usual. Tribal codes are often not published or distributed widely. They are not found in many law firm libraries. To provide some aid to the practitioners in this regard, Appendix II contains the service of process rules of several tribes.
Once the tribal rule is found, the correspondence must be in the right direction. That is to say, the legal problems disappear only if the state method is more liberal than the tribal method. If the opposite is true, 11 then service under the tribal method does not automatically satisfy the state rule. The attorney must be careful to serve under tribal law in a way that will satisfy the state law.
One further practical problem remains. Tribal law may require service by a tribal law enforcement officer. Such an official may be reluctant to serve process with respect to a suit brought in state court. All law enforcement officers are busy; many do not care for civil process serving and service may be expensive, especially on a large reservation. Furthermore, the tribal officer may not be permitted to serve for a state court suit. "6 All in all, it may be difficult to arrange the practical details of service pursuant to the state law in conformity with the tribal law. 4 7 45. See, e.g., the service rules of New Mexico and the Navajo Tribe, discussed supra in note 32. In most ways, the state rule is more generous than the tribal and hence service under the tribe's rule will satisfy the state's. That appears not to be the case, however, with respect to service by publication.
Service by publication raises, as always, due process inquiries. In the case of the Navajo rule, the relevant provision is found in the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (8) .
46. This is, of course, a matter of tribal law. 47. But see Nenna v. Moreno, 132 Ariz. 565, 647 P.2d 1163 (Ariz. App. 1982) , in which the plaintiff used a Papago official to serve process. Service, however, was to no avail, as the court of appeals held there to be no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the suit under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. But see Natewa v. Natewa, 84 N.M. 69, 499 P.2d 691 (1972) . See also Francisco v. State, 113 Ariz. 427, 556 P.2d 1 (1976) (en banc) and especially n.1.
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Knotty legal problems on the one hand; practical difficulties on the other. Service of process on the reservation with proper respect for the defendant's right to due process and the tribe's right of self-government would appear to be an issue especially susceptible to state-tribal cooperation.
III. Execution of Judgment on the Reservation
Consider now the other end of the litigation spectrum. Suppose there is valid subject matter jurisdiction in state court and that service has been properly made-perhaps off-reservation, perhaps on-reservation pursuant to both state and tribal law. The case goes to judgment for the plaintiff and the defendant does not voluntarily pay the debt. Furthermore, the defendant's only nonexempt" s assets lie on the reservation. How may the plaintiff enforce the judgment? Once more, we must distinguish between Public Law 280 and non-Public Law 280 states.
Enforcement of Judgment in Public Law 280 States
Theoretically the question of the enforcement of judgment in Public Law 280 states is as easy as the question of service of process. "Why," a novice might ask, "would Congress grant to the states the power to serve process, hear a case, and determine the outcome under state law, but stop short of allowing enforcement of the judgment obtained?" The answer is that the last step, unlike the first several, directly affects Indian land, and Congress, even while enacting Public Law 280, was protective of Indian land rights. Witness 25 U.S.C. § 1322(b), a proviso to the jurisdictional grant of section 1322(a): "Nothing in this section shall authorize the.., encumbrance.., of any real or personal 
SER VICE/PROCESS-EXECUTION/JUDGMENT 269
Public Law 280 states, execution on a state court judgment presents difficulties and requires the judgment creditor to seek out nontrust property. Unfortunately for the creditor, much Indian property is held in trust. Most tribal property is," 0 as are all allotments where the trust period had not expired before Congress extended it indefinitely in 1934.1' Therefore, even in Public Law 280 states, the plaintiff may well obtain only a personal judgment, unenforceable against all of the defendant's property of any value.
Section 354 of Title 25 makes it clear that it is the fact that the property is in trust which forbids the enforcement of a judgment on the property. Section 1322(b) in turn makes it clear that Public Law 280 has no effect on this protection. Whether the judgment is obtained in a Public Law 280 or a non-Public Law 280 state, trust property will be protected from execution. This explains why all the cases to be discussed involving enforcement of state judgments will concern nontrust property-wages, personalty, and so forth. With respect to this nontrust property, execution should be permitted in Public Law 280 states as the proviso in section 1322(b) does not apply.
Enforcement of Judgment in Non-Public Law 280 States
In non-Public Law 280 states, 5 2 the impact of the bar to encumbrance of trust property equals that discussed above. Again, much reservation land is held in trust, either for the tribe or for individual Indians, and hence will be immune from execution. What of nontrust property: perhaps personalty, perhaps property freed from the restraint, perhaps property held in fee simple, as with the Pueblos? May a valid state court judgment be enforced against such property?
It is easier to see an infringement here than in the case of service of process. Putting aside the discongruity, hypothesized earlier, between state and tribal service statutes and assuming notice conforming to due process, it is difficult to see that mere service of process-notifying the defendant of the pending lawsuit-infringes upon the Indians' right to make their own laws. But with enforcement of judgment, the case seems clearer. Of course, if the tribe prohibits or restricts execution, garnishment, replevin, or the like, the arguments are the same as those discussed at length above. Even if the tribe is silent with respect to execution, or even if it permits it by the same process the state is using, an infringement should be found. The concern now is not merely with the procedure of enforcement, although there are due process inquiries here as well. Enforcement amounts to a seizing of property on the reservation, which constitutes a substantial intrusion into reservation affairs. It is relatively nondisruptive of reservation life to permit a suit, pursuant to an off-reservation transaction, to continue. Discontinuity of service statutes aside, service is proper. Personal judgment may be entered and may, of course, be paid voluntarily. The act of converting the personal judgment into an interest in reservation property, however, should not withstand Williams scrutiny.
The most recent case is in accord with this view. In Joe v. Marcum," U.S. Life sued Joe in New Mexico court over an offreservation debt. Default judgment was entered. U.S. Life then attempted to garnish Joe's wages, earned on the reservation and 53. 621 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1980) . See also Airvator, Inc. v. Turtle Mountain Mfg. Co., 329 N.W.2d 596 (N.D. 1983 ). The issue in Airvator was whether the state court had subject matter jurisdiction over a suit on a contract where the breaching party is a corporation 51% Indian-owned. The North Dakota Supreme Court held that there was subject matter jurisdiction in state court, id. at 604. In dicta, the court then contemplated the eventual judgment: "We do recognize that, in the event a judgment is served in favor of Airvator against Turtle Mountain Manufacturing, enforcement and execution of that judgment in state court may be difficult because the corporation's assets may be located on the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation." Id. at 605. The court appears to recommend that enforcement be sought in tribal court, with subsequent full faith and credit concerns. See id. and infra, text and notes 69-89. 
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owed to Joe by Utah International, a non-Indian, Delaware corporation. Joe sought an injunction in federal court against the garnishment. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the injunction. It is fair to say that the circuit court expressed some reluctance to reach this result; 4 nonetheless, the court held that "to allow the present garnishment proceeding to stand would impinge on tribal sovereignty."1 5 5 The court looked to a number of factors in reaching this conclusion. The preemptive effect of Public Law 280 was considered, although it was not dispositive. So too was the sovereignty of the Navajo Tribe mentioned. The key element, however, was that "to permit a state court of New Mexico to run a garnishment.., on the reservation ... would thwart the Navajo policy not to allow garnishment, ' '56 a policy the court had earlier found legitimate." The court found the Navajo's policy against garnishment to be embodied in silence. 5 8 The court was not persuaded by the argument that the garnishment was ancillary to the underlying suit on the off-reservation debt. A new, on-reservation party, the garnishee, was involved. A new on-reservation res, the wages due, was sought. A new onreservation service of process was required. All in all, the court found the garnishment to be a new suit, sufficiently separate from the initial suit to invoke the Williams test and the subsequent barrier to the state activity.
Two cases prior to Joe v. Marcum had dealt with the issue of execution on the reservation. Little Horn State Bank v. Stops" involved, like Joe v. Marcum, an on-reservation garnishment pursuant to a judgment entered on an off-reservation debt. The Montana Supreme Court did not find the silence of the tribe, here the Crow, on the question of garnishment to be as relevant as did the Tenth Circuit, later, in Joe v. Marcum. "Until the Crow Tribe has provided a means of such enforcement or acted in some manner within this area, we fail to see how tribal self-54. " [W] e recognize that there is authority to the contrary, and that an argument can be made that Joe should not be allowed to use the Navajo Reservation as a sanctuary to insulate himself from state court garnishment proceedings arising from an offreservation transaction with a non-Indian lending agency." Id. at 361. At the heart of the Stops case is the court's view that a judgment that is not enforceable is "absurd." Judgments, of course, are ordinarily not enforceable in other jurisdictions, but the court refers to full faith and credit as the judgment creditor's protection when def-endant is in other states. 6 ' The court, however, does not explain what protection the plaintiff gets when the defendant's property is in a foreign country. Thus, the Montana court's frustration is again with the sovereignty of the Crow Tribe-no foreign country, to be sure, but hardly a mere part of Big Horn County as the court suggests.
The other pre-Joe v. Marcum enforcement of judgment case is Annis v. Dewey County Bank 6 in which the non-Indian creditor bank attempted to execute judgment on defendant's onreservation personal property. As always, the bank's execution was pursuant to a valid judgment on an off-reservation debt. Instead of challenging the execution in state court, as Stops had unsuccessfully tried, Annis sought an injunction in federal court, as Joe was to do several years later. Annis, as did Joe, persuaded the federal court to grant the injunction, the court reasoning very similarly to the Tenth Circuit. Annis's victory, however, was pyrrhic, for the bank counterclaimed in federal court on its state court judgment. After granting Annis's injunction, the district court turned to the bank's counterclaim, found that no independent jurisdictional base was needed, 63 and granted judgment for the bank. The federal marshal was then sent to execute on Annis's cattle, free of any Williams barrier.
The bank's clever and successful tactic, which was inexplicably not copied by U.S. Life in Joe v. Marcum, places the defendant resisting execution in a quandary. He can litigate the matter entirely in state court, even though the right to be free from execution is a federal one. Or, fearing the unhappy state reception that Stops received, the defendant may seek protection of the federal court, there to face the creditor's counterclaim, Here, however, the debtor could gain at least some support from the Ninth Circuit, which has held that a federal court may not hear a diversity suit which would be barred by Williams from state court."
Finally, a series of cases has been decided involving the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act where the obligor is found on a reservation and the support-seeker is found in another state. 67 Generally speaking, these cases are unhelpful on the issue under discussion because the courts seek some offreservation, in-state activity so as to create subject matter jurisdiction in the state court. Most often it is not found. 68 In summary, the Joe v. Marcum view appears correct, with the potentially substantial practical limitation posed by the Dewey County Bank counterclaim.
Enforcement of State Court Judgments in Tribal Court
It was suggested earlier, as a practical way around the problem of service of process on the reservation, that process be served under both state and tribal law. A similar but more complex solution exists with respect to enforcement of the judgment: the judgment creditor may attempt to have the state court judgment enforced in tribal court. This raises interesting questions of full faith and credit and comity. 69 Comity may be discussed rather quickly. That doctrine represents the respect one government shows to another, in this instance by recognizing the other government's court judgments. 7 0 The question is one of the local law of the jurisdiction granting comity, here the tribe. A judgment creditor may always take the state court judgment to the tribal court seeking comity, i.e., arguing to the tribal court that it ought, as a matter of tribal policy, recognize and enforce the state's judgment. It is not at all unlike- ly that the tribal court will grant such recognition, perhaps after some formal or informal hearing to determine that the state judgment was obtained fairly. The existence vel non of comity, of this hearing and the procedures for it, are governed by tribal law, restricted, as always, by the Indian Civil Rights Act's guarantees of due process. 7 More problematical is full faith and credit, a federal policy that might be imposed on the tribes, if Congress is of a mind to do so. 72 The legislation that implements full faith and credit is 28 U.S.C. § 1738. 73 This statute, set out in the margin, 7 4 does not mention Indians, but contains the word "territories," which has been interpreted in some cases to mean Indian tribes." There are several difficulties with the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 to Indian tribes. First, of course, is the unlikely interpretation of "territory" to mean Indian tribe, surely not an interpretation of any sweeping use. 76 Second, there is 25 U.S.C.
§ 1911(d), the Indian Child Welfare Act's full faith and credit clause, 7 7 which calls a tribe a tribe and shows the clarity with which Congress legislates when it wishes to. 78. Naturally, the later statute could be explained as Congress' attempt to leave the matter free of doubt in an area of special concern.
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The greatest difficulty in the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 to tribes is that its interpretation, in this article's context, is left entirely in the hands of the tribal court. There is no appeal from the tribal court into the federal system, 79 and Martinez removed the possibility of collateral attack under the due process clause of the ICRA. s° Thus, if a tribe determines that it is not bound to recognize a state court judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, that interpretation of federal law is final, with no possibility of Supreme Court or other federal court review.
Several cases have discussed full faith and credit issues with respect to Indian tribes, but all of the reported cases are the other way, i.e., in the context of state enforcement of tribal judgments."' Those cases are split, with the majority granting recognition more often as a matter of comity than of full faith and credit. 8 2 
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In summary, then, a plaintiff with a valid state court judgment that must be enforced on the reservation may attempt enforcement in a number of ways:
(1) Ignoring the reservation, the judgment creditor might attempt to enforce the judgment under state law, assuming the sheriff may be convinced of the propriety of such a notion. 3 Joe v. Marcum reasons correctly that this attempt constitutes an infringement on the tribe's self-government.
(2) The judgment creditor might approach the tribal court informally, seeking direct execution under tribal law. Tribal execution of a state court judgment is not a tidy combination," 4 but the generally unpretentious tribal courts might well accept the idea. As noted above, the creditor should expect a hearing of some sort to determine that the state court judgment was fairly obtained.
(3) The judgment creditor might approach the tribal court more formally, bringing suit in tribal court on the state court judgment, arguing that it should be recognized under the doctrine of comity." 5 Comity is a flexible doctrine flowing from sovereign states and should be appealing to a tribal court, especially when the state in turn grants comity to tribal judgments, a theme of reciprocity seen in the state court opinions. 6 (4) The judgment creditor might bring suit in tribal court, arguing that full faith and credit must be given under 28 U.S.C. § 1738. In some cases, this argument, more formal than the last, might prevail where comity would not. A tribal court, reluctant to enforce the judgment of a hostile state but still sensitive to the obligation under a federal statute, might reach this result. Still, given the ambiguity of 28 U.S.C. § 1738, such a court would probably be able to avoid full faith and credit as well as comity and refuse recognition.
(5) Were a tribe and state to be especially cooperative, the tribe might have a registration procedure whereby suit on the state judgment would become unnecessary. 7 The judgment creditor would merely file the judgment with a tribal official, and 83. One of the attractions of garnishment is that the sheriff need not be involved. The writ is sought from and issued by the clerk, off-reservation, and in many states may be served on the garnishee by a private party.
84. And conceivably could raise Indian Civil Rights Act due process questions. 
Conclusion
This article began by noting a number of similarities between service of process and execution of judgment. The discussion above has disclosed an additional similarity, for in each case it was noted how knotty problems could be solved by tribal-state cooperation. Such cooperation, not a hallmark of state-Indian interaction in the past, seems to be an idea whose time has come. 9 If it grows and attacks the question of state court litigation involving reservation Indians and their property, then perhaps this article, which makes no pretense of being the last word on the subject, will be, instead, the last notice taken by anyone concerning the problem. (a) Payment. Any judgment of the Courts against an Indian, which is not paid by the judgment debtor within the time set by the Courts, shall be paid out of funds deposited to the credit of the judgment debtor at the Fort Peck Agency, upon a determination by the Secretary of the Interior or his authorized representative that the payment will not result in hardship to the judgment debtor, and on such terms and conditions as the Secretary may prescribe.
Blackfeet Tribe
Sec. 1 Jurisdiction
The Tribal Court and the State shall have concurrent and not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits wherein the defendant is a member of the Tribe which is brought before the Court. No judgment shall be given on any suit until the defendant has been given ample opportunity to appear in Court in his defense. Evidence of the receipt of notice shall be kept as part of the records in the case. In all civil suits the complainant may be required to deposit with the Clerk of Court a fee or other security in reasonable amount to cover the cost and disbursements in the case. a. Any notice or process to any person or party which is required or may be given or served under any provision of this Code shall be served in accordance with one of the following provisions as applicable.
Sec. 5 Payment of Judgments from Individual Indian Moneys
(1) If to a natural person, by delivering it to him personally, or by leaving it at his usual place of residence with a member of his family of the age of eighteen (18) Civil actions may be instituted either by voluntary appearance and agreement of the parties or by service upon the defendant of a true copy of the filed complaint and notice either personally or as provided herein. The notice shall be attached to the copy of the complaint, and cite the defendant to be and appear before the Court at the time and place therein specified, which shall not be less than 20 days from the date of serving of the complaint and notice. Such service may be made by means of certified mail, return receipt requested. Evidence of the receipt of notice shall be kept as part of the record in case.
Publication.
Upon a showing by the complainant to the Reservation Court that diligent efforts were made to serve the complaint and notice on the defendant pursuant to section 3.1.02 and that service could not be made for sufficient reasons, the judge may allow service to be made by posting copies of the notice and complaint in two public places on the reservation for three weeks and by publication of a copy of the notice and complaint once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the vicinity of the Lummi Indian Reservation. In such case the return date shall be not less than 30 days from the date of first publication.
Payment of Judgments.
Whenever the Lummi Reservation Court shall have ordered payment of money damages to an injured party and the losing party refuses to make such payment, within the time set for payment by the Court, and when the losing party has sufficient funds to his credit at the agency office to pay all or part of such judgment, the Superintendent shall certify to the Secretary of the Interior the record of the case and the amount of the available funds. If the Secretary shall so direct, the disbursing agent shall pay over to the injured party the amount of the judgment, or such lesser amount as may be specified by the Secretary, from the account of the delinquent party. The party in whose favor a money judgment is given by the Courts of the Navajo Tribe may at any time within five years after entry thereof have a writ of execution issued for its enforcement. No execution, however, shall issue after the death of the judgment debtor. A judgment creditor may have as many writs of execution as are necessary to effect collection of the entire amount of the judgment.
Sec. 712. Execution Prior to Judgment (a) Any chattel, legal title to which is in the plaintiff, or upon which the plaintiff holds a lawful lien may be taken into custody and delivered to the Clerk upon a writ of execution issued prior to judgment, upon motion of the plaintiff, for good cause shown and upon posting bond or making a cash deposit in an amount determined by the Court to be sufficient to compensate the defendant for any damages he may suffer as a result of wrongful execution. Plaintiff shall deposit such additional sum as the Court may fix to cover costs of the execution and of the maintenance of the property while in custody.
Oglala Sioux Tribe Sec. 20. Jurisdiction.
The Oglala Sioux Tribal Court shall have jurisdiction of all suits wherein the defendant is a member of the tribe or tribes within their jurisdiction, and of all other suits between members and non-members which are brought before the court by stipulation of both parties. No judgment shall be given on any suit unless the defendant has actually received notice of such suit and ample opportunity to appear in court in his defense. Evidence of the receipt of the notice shall be kept as part of the record in the case. In all civil suits the complainant may be required to deposit with the clerk of court a fee or other security in a reasonable amount to cover costs and disbursements in the case.
Sec. 22. Judgments in Civil Actions.
In all civil cases, judgments may consist of an order of the court awarding money damages to be paid to the injured party, or directing the surrender of certain property to the injured party, or the performance of some other act for the benefit of the injured party. 
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Lake Indian Reservation shall be made by delivering the original summons, with a copy of the complaint attached, to the defendant personally or to a responsible person at the residence or usual abode of the defendant by a police officer of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, or by any other enrolled adult Indian not a party to the action or by certified mail with a return receipt requested. B. The officer or person causing the service to be made shall file a return on a copy of the summons, to the Court, which shall show the place, date, time and person on whom the service was made. Sec. 11-Payment of Judgment from Individual Indian Moneys.
[This section is similar to Lumnmi § 3.4.10] Sec. 14-Judgments: Method of Enforcement Where a judgment requires the payment of money or the delivery of real or personal property, it may be enforced in these respects by execution. Where it requires the performance of any other act, a certified copy of the judgment may be served upon the party against whom it is given, or the person or officer who is required thereby or by law to obey the same; and if he refuses he may be punished by the Court as is provided in Section 19, Chapter 2, Code of Indian Offenses.
Salish and Kootenai Tribes
Sec. 5. Service.
1. The summons and complaint shall be served on the defendant by personal service, whenever possible, within five days, or by mail if the defendant cannot be located. Service by mail shall be made by the Clerk of Court, by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. The return receipt shall be kept in the docket as evidence of the receipt of notice. Personal service shall be made by a law enforcement officer delivering the summons and complaint to the defendant in person. The officer making personal service shall promptly return to the Clerk an affidavit of service when service has been effected, and this affidavit shall be kept in the docket as proof of personal service. If the officer cannot effect personal service within five days, he/she shall so notify the Clerk of Court why service was not possible. 
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285 sonally or by leaving the copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person over the age of 18 years then residing therein. The officer serving the copy of the Complaint and Notice of hearing shall then make proof of service upon the original Notice and pursuant to the provisions of Chapter II, Civil Procedure Section 2.5 Proof of Service.
Section 2.5 Proof of Service
The clerk or the officer serving a copy of the Complaint and Notice of hearing upon a defendant, shall upon making service, sign a verified statement on the back of the original Notice that they personally served a copy of the Complaint and Notice upon the named defendant and shall indicate the time and date of service. The clerk or officer shall then affix their signature to the statement.
Ute Tribe Rule 2. Commencement of Action; Service of Process. a) Commencement of Action. A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint and serving a copy of such on the defendant or defendants as provided herein. The court shall have jurisdiction from such time as both the complaint is filed and properly served upon the defendant and a return of service is filed with the clerk. b) Service of Process. Service of process shall consist of delivering to the party served a copy of the complaint along with a summons, which need not be issued by the judge or clerk, which advises the defendant that he is required to answer the complaint within 20 days or a default judgment will be entered against him.
1) The return of service shall be endorsed with the name of the person serving and the date, time, and place of service and shall be filed with the clerk. 2) Service may be made on a party by delivering the required papers to the party himself or upon some person of suitable age and discretion over 14 years old at the party's home or principal place of business, or on an officer, managing agent or employee, or partner of a non-individual party. 3) Service by publication may be made upon order of the court for good cause shown by publishing the contents of the summons in a local newspaper of general circulation at least once per week for four weeks and by leaving an extra copy of the complaint or paper with the court for the party. 4) Service may be made by any law enforcement officer or other person, not a party, 18 years of age or older. 5) Service upon a person otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Ute Indian Tribal Court may be made anywhere in the United States; otherwise, service shall be made within the exterior boundaries of the Reservation. 6) If a person personally refuses to accept service, service shall be deemed performed if the person is informed of the purpose of the service and offered copies of the papers served.
